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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
 Pursuant to a plea agreement, thirty-year-old Joanne N. Christofferson pleaded 
guilty to felony vehicular manslaughter.  Ms. Christofferson filed an Idaho Criminal 
Rule 12.2 (“Rule 12.2”) motion for additional defense services, requesting a 
psychological examination to assist for mitigation purposes at sentencing.  The district 
court denied the Rule 12.2 motion.  The district court imposed a unified sentence of ten 
years, with five years fixed.  On appeal, Ms. Christofferson asserts the district court 
abused its discretion when it denied her Rule 12.2 motion. 
 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
 Idaho State Police officers responded to a fatal car versus motorcycle crash on 
US 30 in Pocatello.  (Presentence Report (hereinafter, PSI), p.4.)1  At the scene, 
witnesses told the officers the driver of the car, Ms. Christofferson, had been traveling 
east when the car drove left of center into the westbound lane of traffic.  (PSI, p.4.)  The 
car crashed head-on into a motorcycle that had been traveling west in the westbound 
lane.  (PSI, p.4.)  The car then crashed into a fence located just north of the scene.  
(PSI, p.4.)  The driver of the motorcycle, Staci M. Shyrock, was deceased by the time 
the officers arrived at the scene.  (PSI, p.4.)  Inside the car, an officer found a purse 
containing a driver’s license with the name of Ms. Christofferson, a glass pipe with white 
residue, and a prescription bottle with two different colored pills inside and the name of 
Jennifer Reynolds on it.  (PSI, p.5.)   
                                            
1 All citations to the “PSI” refer to the 59-page PDF electronic version of the 
presentence report and attachments. 
 2 
 Ms. Christofferson had been transported to the Portneuf Medical Center.  (PSI, 
pp.4-5.)  Hospital staff found another glass pipe with residue on Ms. Christofferson’s 
person, and she had reportedly told a nurse she had smoked marijuana before getting 
into her car and driving.2  (PSI, p.5.)  The officers obtained a blood sample from 
Ms. Christofferson, and then went back to the hospital with a search warrant to get more 
blood from her.  (PSI, p.5.)  The police report stated “[t]he two methamphetamine pipes 
and the blood will be sent to the Idaho State Police Laboratory for evidentiary 
purposes.”3  (R., p.29.) 
 Ms. Christofferson had sustained injuries including a concussion and bruising.  
(PSI, p.5.)  Following her release from the hospital the day after the crash, officers 
arrested her for vehicular manslaughter.  (PSI, pp.5-6.) 
 The State charged Ms. Christofferson by Prosecuting Attorney’s Information with 
vehicular manslaughter, felony, Idaho Code § 18-4006(3)(a) and/or § 18-4007(3)(a) 
and/or (b), for acting with gross negligence and/or in the commission of a violation of 
I.C. § 18-8004 or § 18-8006.  (R., pp.55-56.)   Ms. Christofferson initially entered a not 
guilty plea.  (R., p.71.)  A public defender was appointed to represent her, and 
Ms. Christofferson later retained private defense counsel.  (See R., pp.35, 95.) 
 Pursuant to a plea agreement, Ms. Christofferson agreed to plead guilty to an 
Amended Information charging her with vehicular manslaughter under I.C. §§ 18-
                                            
2 Later, at the change of plea hearing, the State argued Ms. Christofferson had also 
made statements to another individual at the hospital that “she had used 
methamphetamine.”  (Tr., p.36, Ls.14-17.)  During the presentence investigation, 
Ms. Christofferson stated she had used Clonazepam before the crash, but she did not 
remember the crash itself.  (See PSI, pp.8-9.)  
3 At the change of plea hearing, the State argued “the lab results indicate multiple 
controlled substances in the blood and urine of the defendant . . . .”  (Tr., p.34, Ls.1-3.) 
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4006(3)(a) and 18-4007(3)(a), for acting with gross negligence.  (R., pp.115-18; 121-
27.)  In the Guilty Plea Questionnaire, Ms. Christofferson stated she had been 
diagnosed with depression, bipolar disorder, PTSD, and anxiety.  (R., p.123; see 
Tr., p.25, Ls.1-4.)  The district court accepted Ms. Christofferson’s guilty plea.  
(R., p.116; Tr., p.40, Ls.16-19.) 
 Ms. Christofferson then filed an Ex Parte Motion for Additional Defense Services.  
(R., pp.128-30.)  The motion was made pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 12.2.  
(R., p.128.)  Ms. Christofferson asserted that upon her discharge from the hospital 
following the incident, “a comprehensive psychological evaluation was strongly 
recommended by hospital staff in its discharge instructions. . . .  Hospital records 
reveals a significant and complicated mental health history for Christofferson including 
potential diagnosis of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), depression, bi-polar 
disease and significant anxiety and stress due to circumstances in her life.”  (R., p.129.)  
Thus, Ms. Christofferson “would like to have a comprehensive psychological 
examination to assist for mitigation purposes at sentencing.”  (R., p.129.)   
 The motion for additional defense services then stated counsel “would like to 
engage Dr. John Christensen to perform those functions on behalf of Christofferson.”  
(R., p.129.)  The motion provided Dr. Christensen’s rates, qualifications, and an 
estimate of the total cost of services.  (R., p.129.)  The motion further asserted 
Ms. Christofferson, even though she had retained private counsel “through the 
resources of family members,” by that point had “no income or significant assets which 
could be used to pay for the requested services.”  (R., p.130.)     
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 The district court later issued an Order Regarding Ex-Parte Motion for Additional 
Defense Services.  (R., pp.135-40.)  The district court found “the request for these 
additional services would be duplicative of what has already been ordered.”  (R., p.136.)  
The district court stated that, “[p]ursuant to Idaho Code (IC) § 19-2524 any defendant 
who has been found guilty of a felony undergoes a screening to determine if they are in 
need of an assessment for a substance abuse disorder and/or a mental health 
evaluation.”  (R., pp.136, 138.)  The district court then stated, “[i]f it is determined from 
the screening that further examination is necessary, the case is referred to the Idaho 
Department of Health and Welfare for a full assessment.”  (R., p.138.)  According to the 
district court, “[a]s such, the defendant’s request for a psychological examination is 
unnecessary.”  (R., p.138.)  Thus, the district court denied Ms. Christofferson’s request 
for additional defense services.  (R., p.138.) 
 Ms. Christofferson’s I.C. § 19-2524 screening was completed soon after the 
district court denied her request for additional defense services.  (See PSI, pp.47-49; 
Tr., p.88, L.11 – p.89, L.12.)  The screening reflected that Ms. Christofferson had a 
diagnosis of “Major Depressive Disorder,” as well as “Generalized Anxiety Disorder” and 
“Rule Out – Posttraumatic Stress Disorder or Acute Stress Disorder or other disorder of 
extreme stress.”  (PSI, p.47.)  Major depressive disorder was a “serious mental illness” 
that required the Department of Correction to refer her to the Department of Health and 
Welfare for a full mental health examination.  See I.C. § 19-2524(3)(a) & (c)(iii); 
IDAPA 16.07.33.011.10.  However, Ms. Christofferson never went through the required 
full mental health evaluation.  (See Tr., p.73, L.9 – p.75, L.2, p.96, Ls.12-16.) 
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 At the sentencing hearing, the State recommended the district court impose a 
unified sentence of ten years, with seven years fixed.  (Tr., p.60, L.21 – p.61, L.9.)  
Ms. Christofferson recommended the district court impose a unified sentence of five 
years, with one year fixed, suspend the sentence, and place her on probation.  
(Tr., p.84, Ls.6-20.)  The district court imposed a unified sentence of ten years, with five 
years fixed.  (R., pp.153-58.) 
 Ms. Christofferson filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the district court’s Minute 





Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Ms. Christofferson’s Idaho 
Criminal Rule 12.2 motion for additional defense services? 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Ms. Christofferson’s Idaho 





 Ms. Christofferson asserts the district court abused its discretion when it denied 
her Idaho Criminal Rule 12.2 motion for additional defense services.  The district court 
denied the Rule 12.2 motion after determining the services requested would be 
duplicative of the I.C. § 19-2524 screening and possible mental health examination that 
had already been ordered.  (R., pp.136, 138.)  However, the psychological examination 
services requested by Ms. Christofferson were not duplicative of the Section 19-2524 
screening and mental health examination, because the requested psychological 
examination was to assist Ms. Christofferson in preparing for sentencing.  In contrast, 
the Section 19-2524 screening and mental health examination were mainly to benefit 
the district court.  Because the district court did not recognize this distinction, it did not 
act consistently with the applicable legal standards.  Thus, the district court abused its 
discretion when it denied Ms. Christofferson’s Rule 12.2 motion.  The State will be 
unable to meet its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt the district court’s 
denial of the Rule 12.2 motion was harmless. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
 “[A] denial of a request for expert or investigative assistance will not be disturbed 
absent a showing that the trial court abused its discretion by rendering a decision which 
is clearly erroneous and unsupported by the circumstances of the case.”  State v. Olin, 
103 Idaho 391, 395 (1982).  When an exercise of discretion is reviewed on appeal, the 
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appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry into (1) whether the district court rightly 
perceived the issue as one of discretion, (2) whether the district court acted within the 
outer boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable 
to specific choices, and (3) whether the district court reached its decision by an exercise 
of reason.  State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600 (1989); see State v. Brown, 121 Idaho 
385, 392 (1992) (applying Hedger to a defendant’s request for expert assistance). 
 
C. The District Court Abused Its Discretion Because It Did Not Act Consistently With 
The Applicable Legal Standards 
 
 Ms. Christofferson asserts the district court abused its discretion when it denied 
her Rule 12.2 motion for additional defense services, because the district court did not 
act consistently with the applicable legal standards.  Under the constitutional standards 
for providing additional defense services, as implemented by Rule 12.2, the provision of 
assistance at public expense is required where necessary for a fair trial and a 
meaningful opportunity to present a defense.  Thus, contrary to the district court’s 
determination, the psychological examination services requested by Ms. Christofferson 
were not duplicative of the I.C. § 19-2524 screening and mental health examination, 
because the requested psychological examination was to assist Ms. Christofferson in 
preparing for sentencing.  Conversely, the I.C. § 19-2524 screening and mental health 
examination were mainly for the benefit of the district court.  Because the district court 





1. The Constitutional Standards For Providing Additional Defense Services 
Are Applicable Here 
 
 As a preliminary matter, Ms. Christofferson asserts the constitutional standards 
for providing additional services are applicable in this case.  Idaho Criminal Rule 12.2 
governs motions requesting additional defense services.  As the Legal Counsel for the 
Idaho Supreme Court has written, “Rule 12.2 provides specific procedures and 
guidelines for implementing” the requirements from State v. Olin, 103 Idaho 391 (1982), 
and Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985).  Michael Henderson, Idaho Criminal Rule 
12.2: Guidance for Obtaining Necessary Defense Resources, 57 The Advocate, Official 
Publication of the Idaho State Bar, Nov./Dec. 2014 at 34, 35. 
 In Olin, the Idaho Supreme Court held that I.C. § 19-852(a)4 “recognizes that 
there are cases where a criminal defendant’s right to a fair trial may be jeopardized 
unless there is access not only to an attorney, but also to certain specialized aid in the 
preparation of a defense.”  Olin, 103 Idaho at 394.  The Olin Court wrote, “[i]ncluded 
                                            
4 At the time of the defendant’s trial in Olin, I.C. § 19-852(a) provided the following: 
 
19-852. RIGHT TO COUNSEL OF NEEDY PERSON-REPRESENTATION 
AT ALL STAGES OF CRIMINAL AND COMMITMENT PROCEEDINGS-
PAYMENT.-(a) A needy person who is being detained by a law 
enforcement officer, or who is under formal charge of having committed, 
or is being detained under a conviction of, a serious crime, is entitled: 
 
(1) to be represented by an attorney to the same extent as a person 
having his own counsel is so entitled; and 
 
(2) to be provided with the necessary services and facilities of 
representation (including investigation and other preparation). The 
attorney, services, and facilities and the court costs shall be provided at 
public expense to the extent that the person is, at the time the court 
determines need, unable to provide for their payment. 
 
Olin, 103 Idaho at 394 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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within the scope of I.C. s 19-852(a) are the fourteenth amendment requirements of due 
process and equal protection as they apply to indigent defendants.”  Id.  The Olin Court 
then discussed how “the United States Supreme Court made it clear that ‘state(s) must, 
as a matter of equal protection, provide indigent prisoners with the basic tools of an 
adequate defense or appeal, when those tools are available for a price for other 
prisoners.’”  Id. (quoting Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226, 227 (1971)).  The Olin 
Court also noted, “[i]t is equally evident that if a defendant is denied access to the basic 
tools of an adequate defense, then he has also been denied his due process right of a 
fair trial.”  Id. (citing Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).  However, “[t]he constitution 
does not require a state to provide expert or investigative assistance merely because a 
defendant requests it.”  Id.   
 The Olin Court explained “a defendant’s request for expert or investigative 
services should be reviewed in light of all the circumstances and be measures against 
the standard of ‘fundamental fairness’ embodied in the due process clause.”  Id.  Thus, 
“[b]efore authorizing the expenditure of public funds for a particular purpose in an 
indigent’s defense, the trial court must determine whether the funds are necessary in 
the interest of justice.”  Id. at 395.  The Idaho Supreme Court reiterated the above 
standards from Olin in State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53, 65 (2003), and State v. Dunlap, 
155 Idaho 345, 381-82 (2013).  State v. Abdullah, 158 Idaho 386, 419 (2015).   
 Three years after the Idaho Supreme Court decided Olin, the United States 
Supreme Court in Ake similarly stated, “[t]his Court has long recognized that when a 
State brings its judicial power to bear on an indigent defendant in a criminal proceeding, 
it must take steps to assure that the defendant has a fair opportunity to present his 
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defense.”  Ake, 470 U.S. at 76.  The Ake Court wrote, “[t]his elementary principle, 
grounded in significant part on the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process guarantee of 
fundamental fairness, derives from the belief that justice cannot be equal where, simply 
as a result of his poverty, a defendant is denied the opportunity to participate 
meaningfully in a judicial proceeding in which his liberty is at stake.”  Id.  The United 
States Supreme Court had “recognized long ago that mere access to the courthouse 
doors does not by itself assure a proper functioning of the adversary process, and that a 
criminal trial is fundamentally unfair if the State proceeds against an indigent defendant 
without making certain that he has access to the raw materials integral to the building of 
an effective defense.”  Id. at 77. 
 In the context of a capital murder case, the Ake Court addressed “whether, and 
under what conditions, the participation of a psychiatrist is important enough to 
preparation of a defense to require the State to provide an indigent defendant with 
access to competent psychiatric assistance in preparing the defense.”  See id. at 77.  
The Ake Court identified three relevant factors:  (1) “the private interest that will be 
affected by the action of the State,” (2) “the governmental interest that will be affected if 
the safeguard is to be provided,” and (3) “the probable value of the additional or 
substitute procedural safeguards that are sought, and the risk of an erroneous 
deprivation of the affected interest in those safeguards are not provided.”  Id. 
 On the three factors, the Ake Court stated “[t]he private interest in the accuracy 
of a criminal proceeding that places an individual’s life or liberty at risk is almost 
uniquely compelling.”  Id. at 78.  Conversely, the Ake Court concluded “the 
governmental interest in denying Ake the assistance of a psychiatrist is not substantial, 
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in light of the compelling interest of both the State and the individual in accurate 
dispositions.”  Id.   
 As for the probable value of the psychiatric assistance sought, and the risk of 
error if such assistance were not offered, the Ake Court recognized “that when the State 
has made the defendant’s mental condition relevant to his criminal culpability and to the 
punishment he might suffer, the assistance of a psychiatrist may well be crucial to the 
defendant’s ability to marsh his defense.”  Id. at 80.  The Ake Court also recognized that 
“[p]sychiatry is not . . . an exact science,” and factfinders must often “resolve differences 
in opinion within the psychiatric profession on the basis of the evidence offered by each 
party.”  See id. at 81.  The Ake Court concluded that, “without the assistance of a 
psychiatrist to conduct a professional examination on issues relevant to the defense, to 
help determine whether the insanity defense is viable, to present testimony, and to 
assist in preparing the cross-examination of a State’s psychiatric witnesses, the risk of 
an inaccurate resolution of sanity issues is extremely high.”  Id. at 82.  However, “[w]ith 
such assistance, the defendant is fairly able to present at least enough information to 
the jury, in a meaningful manner, as to permit it to make a sensible determination.”  Id. 
 Thus, the Ake Court held that “when a defendant demonstrates to the trial judge 
that his sanity at the time of the offense is to be a significant factor at trial, the State 
must, at a minimum, assure the defendant access to a competent psychiatrist who will 
conduct an appropriate examination and assist in evaluation, preparation, and 
presentation of the defense.”  Id. at 83.  The Ake Court noted an indigent defendant did 
not have “a constitutional right to choose a psychiatrist of his personal liking or to 
receive funds to hire his own.”  See id.  The Ake Court also held, “in the context of a 
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capital sentencing proceeding, when the State presents psychiatric evidence of the 
defendant’s future dangerousness,” that “due process requires access to a psychiatric 
examination on relevant issues, to the testimony of the psychiatrist, and to assistance in 
preparation at the sentencing phase.”  Id. at 83-84. 
 The Idaho Supreme Court has held “[t]here is little to no substantive difference 
between the Ake standards and this Court’s standards in Olin, Lovelace, and Dunlap.”  
Abdullah, 158 Idaho at 420 (citing State v. Martin, 146 Idaho 357, 363 (Ct. App. 2008)).  
Although Ake and the Idaho Supreme Court’s cases articulate the test differently, “each 
of these cases requires the provision of assistance at public expense where is it 
necessary for a fair trial and a meaningful opportunity to present a defense, while sifting 
out requests for services that are not shown to be reasonably necessary for these 
purposes.”  Id. (citing Martin, 146 Idaho at 363).   
 The Legal Counsel for the Idaho Supreme Court has explained “Rule 12.2 is 
intended to guide this process of distinguishing meritorious requests for necessary 
resources from unsupported or unnecessary requests.”  Henderson, 57 The Advocate 
Nov./Dec. 2014, at 36.  Under Rule 12.2, “[a] defendant may submit a motion seeking 
public funds for pay for investigative, expert, or other services that he believes to be 
necessary for his defense.  The motion must be made in advance of the defense 
incurring the costs and requires prior approval of the court.”  I.C.R. 12.2(a).  The rule 
also contains a list of required information for the motion.  I.C.R. 12.2(b).  Rule 12.2 
further states, “[t]he court shall decide the motion on the basis of the record in the case 
and the information submitted by the defendant.”  I.C.R. 12.2(d). 
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 In light of the above, Ms. Christofferson submits the constitutional standards from 
Olin and Ake are applicable here.  Before Rule 12.2, Idaho’s appellate courts applied 
the Olin and Ake standards to requests for additional defense services in noncapital 
cases.  See State v. Brown, 121 Idaho 385, 392 (1992) (holding under Olin, in a rape, 
robbery, and aggravated battery case, the district court did not abuse its discretion in 
denying the defendant’s request to be examined by an expert of his choice regarding 
his mental capacity, where the defendant had already been examined by a psychologist 
and a psychiatrist); Martin, 146 Idaho at 359, 361-64 (holding under Olin and Ake, in a 
possession of methamphetamine case, the district court did not err in denying the 
defendant’s request for testing the physical evidence).   
 Idaho’s appellate courts have also applied Olin to requests for additional defense 
services in the context of sentencing or other post-judgment proceedings.  See Brown, 
121 Idaho at 387, 392 (sentencing); State v. Murphy, 133 Idaho 489, 491-92 (Ct. App. 
1999) (addressing the district court’s denial of the defendant’s request for “post-trial 
investigative services” to assist with preparation of the defendant’s Idaho Criminal 
Rule 29 motion for acquittal). 
 Thus, because Idaho’s appellate courts have applied the Olin and Ake standards 
to noncapital cases and sentencing proceedings, and “Rule 12.2 provides specific 
procedures and guidelines for implementing the Olin and Ake requirements,” see 
Henderson, 57 The Advocate Nov./Dec. 2014, at 35, Ms. Christofferson submits the 
Olin and Ake constitutional standards are applicable to the circumstances here, namely 
a sentencing proceeding in a noncapital case.  
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2. The Psychological Examination Services Requested By Ms. Christofferson 
Were Not Duplicative Of The I.C. § 19-2524 Screening And Mental Health 
Examination 
 
 Ms. Christofferson asserts the psychological examination services she requested 
were not duplicative of the I.C. § 19-2524 screening and mental health examination, 
because the requested psychological examination was to assist Ms. Christofferson in 
preparing for sentencing.  The expert assistance services contemplated by Olin and Ake 
and now administered through Rule 12.2 are intended to aid the defendant in preparing 
her defense.  In contrast, the Section 19-2524 screening and mental health examination 
are mainly for the benefit of the district court.   
 The expert assistance services contemplated by Olin and Ake and now 
administered through Rule 12.2 are intended to aid the defendant in preparing 
her defense.  In Ake, the United States Supreme Court held that once a defendant 
made the threshold showing his sanity at the time of the offense was to be a significant 
factor at trial, the State must “assure the defendant access to a competent psychiatrist 
who will conduct an appropriate examination and assist in evaluation, preparation, and 
presentation of the defense.”  Ake, 470 U.S. at 83.  The Ake Court also held, with 
respect to a capital sentencing proceeding where the State presented psychiatric 
evidence of the defendant’s future dangerousness, that “due process requires access to 
a psychiatric examination on relevant issue, to the testimony of the psychiatrist, and to 
assistance in preparation at the sentencing phase.”  Id. at 83-84.   
 The Idaho Supreme Court in Olin similarly held that I.C. § 19-852(a) “recognizes 
that there are cases where a criminal defendant’s right to a fair trial may be jeopardized 
unless there is access not only to an attorney, but also to certain specialized aid in the 
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preparation of a defense.”  Olin, 103 Idaho at 394.  Thus, the expert assistance services 
administered through Rule 12.2, see Henderson, 57 The Advocate Nov./Dec. 2014, at 
35,  are intended to aid the defendant in preparing her defense.   
 In contrast, the screening and mental health examination contemplated by 
I.C. § 19-2524 are not primarily intended to aid the defendant in preparing a defense.  
Rather, the Section 19-2524 screening and mental health examination are mainly for 
the benefit of the district court.  The district court in this case said as much at the 
sentencing hearing, stating “[t]he purpose of the screening and, ultimately, an 
evaluation whether its’s a substance abuse or a mental health evaluation is to help the 
Court with purposes of sentencing here.”  (Tr., Feb. 26, 2016, p.96, Ls.3-7.)   
 For example, I.C. § 19-2524 provides “a screening to determine whether a 
defendant is in need of a substance use disorder assessment and/or a mental health 
examination shall be made in every felony case unless the court waives the requirement 
for a screening.”  I.C. § 19-2524(1)(a).  The fact that the district court, not the defendant, 
may waive the Section 19-2524 screening indicates the screening is focused on the 
interests of the district court in crafting a sentence, not the defendant in preparing 
a defense. 
 Further, Section 19-2524 indicates the mental health examination is likewise 
focused on the interests of the district court.  If the screening indicates that “a serious 
mental illness may be present”, the statute requires the Department of Correction to 
refer the defendant to the Department of Health and Welfare “for further examination.”  
I.C. § 19-2524(3)(a).  Once the mental health examination is complete, “the court shall 
be provided, as part of the presentence report or other department of health and welfare 
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report to the court, a copy of the mental health assessment along with a summary 
report.”  I.C. § 19-2524(3)(c).    
 The Idaho Supreme Court has stated that a presentence report, fundamentally, 
“is used to assist the ‘court in individualizing a rational sentence for the defendant.’”  
State v. Romero, 116 Idaho 391, 393 (1989) (quoting Idaho Judge’s Sentencing 
Manual, § 5.52) (emphasis in original).  The Romero Court wrote of “the compelling 
need for information about the defendant at sentencing . . . .”  Id.  The Romero Court 
declared that without the “crucial information” provided in such sources as a 
presentence report, “it is impossible for a sentencing court to make an informed 
decision necessary to promote” the four goals of sentencing.  Id. at 396; see State v. 
Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 569 (Ct. App. 1982).  Thus the inclusion of the Section 19-2524 
mental health examination in the presentence report indicates the mental health 
examination, if one is performed, is also mainly for the benefit of the district court.5 
 Perhaps most importantly, Section 19-2524 is limited in scope and only 
mandates the screening and (if required) mental health examination of a defendant.  
The statute does not provide for any of the other services included in the Olin and Ake 
standards.  See generally I.C. § 19-2524.  A Section 19-2524 screening evaluator or 
mental health evaluator “would not assist in evaluation, preparation, and presentation of 
the defense,” see Ake, 470 U.S. at 83, nor would the evaluator furnish “certain 
specialized aid in the preparation of a defense.”  See Olin, 103 Idaho at 394.   
                                            
5 Idaho Criminal Rule 32 provides that the contents of a presentence report shall include 
“any report prepared pursuant to . . . I.C. § 19-2524.”  I.C.R. 32(b)(10).  If the screening 
constitutes a report prepared pursuant to I.C. § 19-2524, this assertion would also apply 
to the screening. 
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 Some courts in other jurisdictions have held merely having a “neutral” expert 
examine the defendant without providing further assistance is insufficient to meet the 
requirements of Ake.  See, e.g., State v. Gambrell, 347 S.E.2d 390, 395 (N.C. 1986) 
(“What is required, as Ake makes clear, is that defendant be furnished with a competent 
psychiatrist for the purpose of not only examining defendant but also assisting 
defendant in evaluating, preparing, and presenting his defense in both the guilt and 
sentencing phases.”); Lindsey v. State, 330 S.E.2d 563, 567 (Ga. 1985) (“[I]n additional 
to examining the defendant, the psychiatrist must assist the defense by aiding defense 
counsel in the cross-examination and rebuttal of the state’s medical experts.”); De 
Freece v. State, 848 S.W.2d 150, 159 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 1993) (“In an adversarial 
system due process requires at least a reasonably level playing field at trial.  In the 
present context that means more than just an examination by a ‘neutral’ psychiatrist.”).  
But see Granviel v. Lynaugh, 881 F.2d 185, 192 (5th Cir. 1989) (“Availability of a neutral 
expert provides defendants with ‘the raw materials integral to the building of an 
effective defense.”). 
 Section 19-2524 does not provide for an evaluator to render any assistance to a 
defendant in evaluating, preparing, and presenting her defense.  See generally 
I.C. § 19-2524.  Thus, the limited scope of the statute shows the screening and mental 
health examination contemplated by I.C. § 19-2524 are not primarily intended to aid the 
defendant in preparing a defense.   
 Here, Ms. Christofferson requested a psychological examination to assist her in 
preparing for sentencing.  Unlike the requested psychological examination, the 
I.C. § 19-2524 screening performed in this case was mainly for the benefit of the district 
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court. Thus, the psychological examination services requested by Ms. Christofferson 
were not duplicative of the Section 19-2524 screening (and possible mental health 
examination, which was not performed).  Because the district court did not recognize 
this distinction, it abused its discretion when it denied Ms. Christofferson’s Rule 12.2 
motion by not acting consistently with the applicable legal standards.  See Hedger, 115 
Idaho at 598. 
 
D. The State Will Be Unable To Meet Its Burden Of Proving Beyond A Reasonable 
Doubt The District Court’s Denial Of Ms. Christofferson’s Rule 12.2 Motion 
Was Harmless 
 
Ms. Christofferson asserts the State will be unable to meet its burden of proving 
beyond a reasonable doubt the district court’s denial of her Rule 12.2 motion was 
harmless.  Where alleged error is followed by a contemporaneous objection and the 
appellant shows that a violation occurred, the State bears the burden of proving the 
error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, based upon the test articulated by the 
United States Supreme Court in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967).  See 
State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227 (2010).  In the context of decisions related to 
sentencing, the State has the burden of showing beyond a reasonable doubt the error 
did not contribute to the sentence imposed.  See State v. Dunlap, 155 Idaho 345, 363 
(2013) (holding, in a capital case, that upon a showing of preserved error by a 
defendant, “the State has the burden of demonstrating beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the error did not contribute to the death sentence.”  (footnote omitted)). 
The State will be unable to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the district 
court’s denial of Ms. Christofferson’s Rule 12.2 motion did not contribute to the 
sentence imposed.  Even though Ms. Christofferson had a “serious mental illness” that 
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required the Department of Correction to refer her for a full mental health evaluation, 
she never went through one.  (See PSI, p.47; Tr., p.73, L.9 – p.75, L.2, p.96, Ls.12-16.)  
Thus, without the requested psychological examination services, Ms. Christofferson was 
unable to articulate the full extent of her mental health issues for sentencing.  At the 
sentencing hearing, defense counsel explained what was missing in the context of 
I.C. § 19-2425(c): 
Report, written report, there is supposed to be a description and nature of 
the exam.  Well, since there wasn’t an exam, that wasn’t included.  Again, 
a multiaxial diagnosis that wasn’t included.  A description of the 
defendant’s diagnosis, including PTSD, especially when there is a serious 
mental illness involved, which there is.  That wasn’t included.  There was 
no analysis of the percentage of impairment.  There is no consideration of 
the risk of taking this defendant may create for the public.  We don’t know 
any of that because it wasn’t included, even though our State Legislature 
has mandated that this is to be included. 
 
(Tr., Feb. 26, 2016, p.75, Ls.3-17.)  Defense counsel submitted “that sentencing 
Ms. Christofferson on the sparse information currently before us would be a mistake of 
law.”  (Tr., Feb. 26, 2016, p.76, Ls.13-14.)   
 Even though the I.C. § 19-2524 screening stated Ms. Christofferson had 
diagnoses of “Major Depressive Disorder,” “Generalized Anxiety Disorder,” and “Rule 
Out – Posttraumatic Stress Disorder or Acute Stress Disorder or other disorder of 
extreme stress” (PSI, p.47), the Section 19-2524 screening did not necessarily reflect 
the full extent of her mental health issues.  As the United States Supreme Court in Ake 
recognized, “[p]sychiatry is not . . . an exact science.”  See Ake, 470 U.S. at 81.  The 
Ake Court stated “psychiatrists disagree widely and frequently . . . on the appropriate 
diagnosis to be attached to given behavior and symptoms . . . .”  Id.  Thus, a full 
psychological examination as requested could have resulted in different, potentially 
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more-accurate diagnoses, such as going beyond the preliminary “Rule Out” diagnoses 
of the screening to determine whether Ms. Christofferson suffered from posttraumatic 
stress disorder or acute stress disorder.  See United States v. Grape, 549 F.3d 591, 593 
n.2 (3d Cir. 2008) (“A ‘rule out’ diagnosis, according to Dr. Pietz’s testimony, means 
there is ‘evidence that [the patient] may meet the criteria for that diagnosis, but [the 
doctors] need more information to rule it out.’”).  But without the requested psychological 
examination services, Ms. Christofferson was unable to articulate the full extent of her 
mental health issues. 
 Further, the requested psychological examination services could have also 
provided Ms. Christofferson with assistance in evaluating, preparing, and presenting her 
defense at sentencing.  See Gambrell, 347 S.E.2d at 395.  As indicated above, the 
Section 19-2524 mental health screening simply did not provide Ms. Christofferson with 
such assistance.  See generally I.C. § 19-2524.  Thus, the State will be unable to prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the district court’s denial of Ms. Christofferson’s 
Rule 12.2 motion did not contribute to the sentence imposed.   
Because the district court abused its discretion, Ms. Christofferson’s judgment of 
conviction should be vacated, the district court order’s denying her Rule 12.2 motion 
should be reversed, and the case should be remanded for the district court to decide the 




 For the above reasons, Ms. Christofferson respectfully requests this Court vacate 
her judgment of conviction, reverse the district court’s order denying her Rule 12.2 
motion, and remand the case for further proceedings. 
 DATED this 28th day of September, 2016. 
 
      __________/s/_______________ 
      BEN P. MCGREEVY 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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